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CRIMINAL RESTITUTION:
A SURVEY OF ITS PAST HISTORY AND AN ANALYSIS OF
ITS PRESENT USEFULNESS
Richard E. Laster*
n the complex structure often inappropriately designated the system
of criminal justice,a there are few visible signs of consideration for
the party who suffers most from criminal activity-the victim. Yet,
historically, this was not always the situation, nor is it necessarily true
today in countries other than the United States. Even in the United
States compensation plans for yictims of crime have been passed by a
few state legislatures, and most state statutes on probation allow resti-
tution by the criminal to his victim as a condition thereof. In addition,
at the less visible levels of the criminal legal process, restitution is an
accepted and pervasive practice, but little is known and less is written
about that practice. This article is an attempt to make visible the per-
vasiveness of the practice of criminal restitution in the United States.
In so doing, it traces the historical roots of criminal restitution to the
period of community composition, and then explores the contemporary
use of restitution in the present administration of criminal justice.
I. EARLY HISTORY OF CRIMINAL RESTITUTION
At an early era in the history of mankind, it would have been dif-
ficult to distinguish victim from criminal because a person injured by
a violent attack would take.personal revenge against his attacker, and
their original positions would then be reversed.' This personal re-
venge, satisfaction, or blood-feud is what Stephen Schafer calls the
earliest form of compensation to the victim, and he labels it aggressive
retaliation.2 Aggressive retaliation was not an early form of com-
munity punishment, however; it simply mirrored man's struggle for
* Member of the Virginia Bar. BA., Virginia, 1966; LL.B, Richmond, 1969; LL.M.,
Harvard, 1970.
ait has been more appropriately designated "the non-system of criminal injustice"
by Professor James Vorenberg of the Harvard Law School.
1S. SaaFF, Tm VictmI & His CRIMINAL 8 (1968).
2 Id. at 10.
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survival in a violent environment.3 Revenge was a personal or familiar
matter, and not until societal attempts were made to limit its harmful
effects did the concept of order in a structured community commence.4
In complimentary fashion, as the community developed, the need for
order became increasingly important, so that personal revenge was re-
placed by community settlement to limit blood-feudsO and promote
interaction among the familial groups who made up the community."
'Later as the community became structured and its leadership more
centralized, codes of law were enacted 7 to serve as guidelines for ac-
ceptable interactive behavior.8 Quite unlike the laws found today in
most "civilized" 9 communities, the laws of primitive societies con-
tained monetary evaluations for most offenses as compensation to the
victim, not as punishment of the criminal.10 Schafer correlates the vic-
tim's demand for monetary compensation rather than personal revenge
with man's growing desire for the acquisition of private property.1
Whatever the reason, graduated scales of compensation to victims of
crime are to be found among the codes of a number of early societies,
including the Torah, 12 the celebrated Code of Hammurabi,13 and the
early English codes.' 4
3 Id. at 8.
4 M. FRY, ARMS OF THE LAW 27 (1951).
5 2 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 35 (1909); S. SCHAFER, REsrmmoN
TO VICnMS OF CRIME 5 (1960).
'A. DIAMOND, PRIMITIVE LAw 187-89 (2d ed. 1950).
7 H. MAINE, ANCIENT LAw 14 (16th ed. 1897).
8 A. DIAMOND, supra note 6, at 31.
9 Civilized as used here means highly developed as contrasted with primitive, meaning
less developed. Civilization is a slippery word. Compare "The use of imprisonment as a
punishment.. . is a sign of advancing civilization." 2 F. POLLACK & F. MAm.uND, THE
HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 514 (1895), 'with, "It is perhaps worth noting that our
barbarian ancestors were wiser and more just than we are today, for they adopted
the theory of restitution to -the injured, whereas we have abandoned this practice, to
the detriment of all concerned." H. BARNES & N. TEETERS, NEW HoRIzoNs IN CRIMI-
NoLoGY 401 (1943).
' '(See M. FRY, supra note 4, at 26-31; T. HOLLAND, ELEMENTS OF JuRISpRUDENcE 379-79
(1916); S. SCHAFER, supra note 5, at 3-5; W. TALLACK, REPARATION TO TH INJURED 6-7
(1900). "Compensation to victims of crime is as old as civilization." Childres, Com-
pensation for Criminally Inflicted Personal Injury, 39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 444 (1964).
11 S. ScaER, supra note 1, at 4-5.
12 A. DIAMOND, supra note 6, at 102-25; S. SCHAFER, supra note 5, at 4.
18A. DIAMOND, supra note 6, at 20-32; S. SCHAFER, supra note 5, at 4; Wolfgang,
Victim Compensation in Crimes of Personal Violence, 50 MINN. L. REv. 223, 224-25
(1965).
14 A. DIAMOND, supra note 6, at 62-70; M. FRY, supra note 4, at 28-29; 2 F. POLLACK &
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An additional characteristic that distinguishes early codes of law
from their modem counterparts is that primitive codes were addressed
to the judges to serve as guidelines for decision making, not as positive
rules, which, if disobeyed, would result in a specific form of punish-
ment.15 Consequently, these codes encouraged settlement or composi-
tion between the parties for harmful acts as serious as homicide, per-
sonal injury less than homicide, rape, adultery, and theft.16 Crimes,
i.e., acts which invariably resulted in community punishment in primi-
tive societies and in Anglo-Saxon England, were incest, witchcraft,
bestiality,17 and a few sacral offenses.' s These were necessarily crimes
or sins because restitution to a single individual was not possible. 9 Of
significance and closely paralleling this list of early crimes or sins were
those offenses punished by the community in East Africa before the
relatively recent introduction of an English legal system.20
One theory has been advanced to explain the system of restitution
in East Africa as a necessary solution to the fear of witchcraft in that
area of the world.21 There was fear that if an injured party sought
punishment of the criminal who might be a witch, the victim would
F. MA LAND, Tab HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAWv 449 (1895); W. TAILACK, Supra note 10,
at 8-9.
'
5 A. DIAMoND, supra note 6, at 31. The Hebrew word Torah is from the root word
"Yarah," which means to point or show the way. Id. at 86. This flexibility in the
enforcement of laws granted broad discretion in the judge or king and may have
often had a negative effect on the legal process. See 2 F. PoLLAcK & F. MArAND,
supra note 14, at 459.
3-6See A. D .mo N,, supra note 6, at 304-30; H. MAmJE, supra note 7, at 370; 2
F. PoLLAcx & F. MAITLND, supra note 14, at 455; Wolfgang, supra note 13, at 226.
17 See A. DIrAmo, supra note 6, at 280.
18 See H. MAINE, supra note 7, at 371. Treason and cowardice were also crimes in
Anglo-Saxon England. See 2 F. Pou.dcK & F. MArrLAND, supra note 14, at 460.
19See A. DmoN-D, supra note 6, at 279. As certain Violent acts involving personal
injury became unemendable in England, they became crimes. 2 F. POLLACK & F. MArr-
LAND, supra note 14, at 457.
An analogous concept appears among the Barotse of Northern Rhodesia. Com-
pensation was allowed for an injury committed by a member of one tribe or familial
group on another, but compensation was not allowed for an intragroup killing.
Therefore, the latter act was a crime or sin in that community;. punishment was meted
out unless the miscreant fled. See M. GLUCKMAN, IDEAs ix BAROTsE JURIsPRuDExcE 206 °
(1965).
2 0 Katende, Why Were Punishments In Pre-European East Africa Mainly Compensa-
tive Rather Than Punitive?, 2 DAR Es SALA,€m LJ. 122, 129 (1967). (Zf. T. ELAs,
LA NATUm Du DRoIT COPnMIER AFmCAi 147.'(1961).' See also Read. Crime and.
Punishment in East Africa: The Twilight of Customary Law, 10 How. L.J. 164 (1964):
21 Katende, supra note 20. - . - I :
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
subject himself to possible retaliation through sorcery.22 Therefore, the
tribal council refused to punish one party; instead it attempted to
reconcile the two parties to prevent retaliation or fear thereof.23 The
same theory, however, cannot be transported across the ocean to ex-
plain the existence of a system of composition which existed in early
societies and up until the end of the Anglo-Saxon period in England.
A plausible explanation for early communal composition in western and
African culture, advocated by Stephen Schafer and Lon Fuller, is
;that settlement is a highly purposive act.24 There are benefits to the
community in reduction of tension, benefits to the victim in monetary
satisfaction, and benefits to the criminal in retrieving his lost security.2 5
Lending credence to this theory advanced by Schafer and Fuller is
the pervasiveness of community composition across cultural and geo-
graphical lines for serious, intentional wrongs to individuals;26 acts
which today in western countries are treated as crimes.27 One could
deduce from the pervasiveness of the practice of community composi-
tion that nothing logically compels the criminalization of intentional
harmful acts. Yet if this be true one might well ask why the settle-
ment of these acts by community composition in England gave way
to punishment, and what led to the growth of a separate body of Anglo-
American criminal law.
There is a conflict among historians as to the exact reasons for a
divergence of the common law into today's civil and criminal com-
ponents. Most historians recognize that there was no distinction be-
tween public and private wrongs for acts involving personal injury
until the end of the Anglo-Saxon period in English history.28 At that
22 Id. at 127.
23 Id. at 126. Mr. Katende's theory, although interesting, oversimplifies the case for
composition in African societies. Max Gluckman contends that composition between
different groups was needed to balance the blood equilibrium that was upset by a
violent act. M. GLocKmA , supra note 19, at 205-06.
2 4 Fuller, The Law's Precarious Hold on Life, 3 GA. L. REv. 530, 539 (1969); Letter
from Stephen Schafer to Senator Joseph Tydings, December 10, 1969.
25 Letter from Stephen Schafer, supra note 24, at 3, 4.
26 There are a number of books on this topic. See, e.g., E. HoEBEL, THE LAw OF
PRIMITIVE MAN (1954); S. SCHAFER, REIT ON To VICTIMS OF CRiME (1960). For
specific procedural examples, see M. GLUCKMAN, TnE JUDICIAL PROCESS AMONG THE
BAROTSE OF NORTHERN RHODESIA 163-223 (1955).
27 Naturally this statement must be qualified because in western culture crimes vary
from country to country. See the interesting discussion by T. ELIAS, supra note 20,
.at 142-43.
28 M. FRY, supra note 4, at 31; 2 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 33
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time, some scholars argue, the introduction of feudalism strengthened
the authority of the king and enabled him to create a structured court
system, where certain intentionally harmful acts were defined as of-
fenses against the king's peace.2 Other historians maintain that the
growth in the strength of the Church and the reintroduction of Roman
law into England around the twelfth century, together laid the philo-
sophical foundation for the acceptability of punishment as an aim of
the law.30 Still other historians contend that the king's taking a share
of the victim's compensation as a fine or wite in certain cases involving
harms led to the creation and justification for a specifically criminal
law.31 Yet these approaches are mutually compatible because without
the rise of kingship, a structured court system, and the acceptability
of punishment as an aim of the law, a system of fines payable to a
centralized authority might never have been instituted. Recognizing the
compatibility of these historical positions, yet keeping within the frame-
work of a discussion of criminal restitution, emphasis will be placed
here on the introduction of the system of fines payable to the Crown
as a contributing factor in separating the law into its present civil and
criminal components, by effectively destroying the system of com-
munity composition.
In primitive law when the community or tribe set the amount of
compensation owed a victim by his criminal, the aim of that primitive
legal process was primarily to make the victim whole and secondarily
to minimize private revenge." There was no "criminal" or "civil" law,
and any penalty for the miscreant was merely incidental to the pro-
ceedings and took the form of a monetary loss. 33 When the king or
overlord began to take their share of the victim's compensation, how-
ever, the focus of the proceedings shifted from the victim to the
(1909); 2 F. POLLACK & F. MAITLAN, supra note 14, at 446-57; S. SctEm4v, supra note 5,
at 6, 7.
' 2 W. HOLDsWORTH, supra note 28, at 11.
80 2 F. POLLACK & F. MArrLAND, supra note 14, at 460.
3t M. FRY, supra note 4, at 31; S. ScHAi, supra note 5, at 8. The hot represented a
compensative payment and the wite a fine to the king or overlord. S. ScmniR, supra
note 1, at 18.
82 "It was an era where there was no room for societal or other considerations in
the criminal procedure; the procedure was exclusively aimed at the private compensa-
tion of the victim." Letter from Stephen Schafer to Senator Joseph Tydings, supra
note 24, at 4.3 3 See H. MAINE, supra note 7, at 369-71. Maine does add, however, that there were
"sins" punished by the Roman community and certain serious wrongs to the state
punished by special law. Id. at 672-74.
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criminal. The next step was for the king to take the entire compensa-
tive payment 4 and thus effectively destroy the process of community
composition and raise punishment to the level of satisfaction.
The victim was necessarily reluctant to give up his previously fa-
vored position to the state, but he was forced into compliance by a
slowly evolving carrot and stick philosophy. The common law de-
veloped so as to prevent the victim from receiving restitution until he
did everything in his power to get the wrongdoer to justice. The deci-
sional law created the crime of "theftbote," making it a misdemeanor
for the injured party to take his goods back or make other arrange-
ments with the felon on an agreement not to prosecute. 35 Felonies
suspended the civil remedies of the injured party, with the statutory ex-
ception of bankers, until the felon was acquitted or convicted."6 If the
owner of stolen goods gave evidence against the felon, he was entitled
to get his goods back;3 7 and statutory law imposed a fine on those
advertisers and printers who advertised a reward for the return of
stolen goods without more.3
As the common law grew, and the gulf between civil and criminal
law grew wider, penalties for the victim increased as his monetary
satisfaction diminished, so that while compounding a felony was a
misdemeanor at common law, 9 today in the United States, most juris-
dictions treat it as a felony.40 Similarly, an agreement not to prosecute
for a misdemeanor was simply unenforceable at common law,41 but
today such an agreement is itself a misdemeanor in most states.42 Legal
philosophers complemented the coercive scheme of the common law,
by contending that victims were satisfied just by being a part of a pro-
ceeding which protected the state.43 This philosophy tended to push the
victim farther into the background of the criminal legal process, so
that today in the United States, the state may prosecute on the vic-
34 S. SCHAFER, supra note 1, at 19; V. TALLACK, supra note 10, at 11; Wolfgang.
supra note 13, at 228.
35 4 W. BLACXSTONE, COMMENTARIES 133 (Chitty ed. 1826).
36 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 119 (Chitty ed. 1826).
371d.
384 W. BLACESTO-E, supra note 35, at 133.
39 R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 445 (1957).
40 See p. 96 and notes 101-02 infra.
41 R. PERKINS, supra note 39, at 445.
42 See p. 96 and notes 101-02 infra.
43 See 4 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 35, at 6.
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tim's behalf with or without his consent." Furthermore, the state col-
lects fines from the criminal and exacts his punishment, while the vic-
tim is left to ineffectual civil remedies against the criminal.45
Thus the system of fines paid to the Crown gave impetus to the
separate growth of a criminal law for acts involving harm to indi-
viduals because it involved the state in the dispositionary stage of a
legal proceeding in its own behalf.46 From this minor intrusion, the
role of the state eventually changed from that of an arbitrating or
mediating force to a punishing one. The change in the role of the
state had immediate procedural consequences in the form of a new
dispositionary result, and a more long range effect in facilitating a
separate punitive law for criminals. It will also be seen from the fol-
lowing discussion that the 'wite payable to the king or overlord had a
significant effect on the philosophical development of modern criminal
law and its concept of harm.
The process of community composition, which replaced familial
blood-feuds, aimed at maximizing human interdependence by making
order out of chaos. The community, in mediating a dispute between
criminal and victim acted as a controlling force, and the interests of
both victim and criminal were taken into consideration in settling their
dispute and in calming the community. The king's 'wite was also taken
with a view toward maintaining order and stability,47 but unlike com-
munity settlement, the result was a destructive rather than a construc-
tive one. Instead of restoring the victim to his original position, the
payment of a fine to the king was aimed at punishing the criminal
and increasing the wealth of the state.48 One philosophical tenet on
which the qwite was justified was the preservation of order,49 but there
is no historical evidence that punishment served better to stabilize the
44See E. Scuar, OUR CRL tINAL SocmY 196 (1969); J. WILSON, VARIETIs INv PoLICE
BEAVIOR 85 (1968); J. Goldstein, Police Discretion not to Invoke the Criminal
Process: Loa-Visibility Decisions in the Administration of justice, 69 YALn L.J. 543,
573-74 (1960).
45 S. ScmwER, supra note 1, at 26; Compensation for Victims of Crime, 33 U. Cm. L.
REv. 531, 534 (1966).
46 Cf. T. HOLLAwD, ELMErmrs OF JuRIsPRuDENcE 366 (12th ed. 1916).
47W. HoLDswoRTm, supra note 5, at 38. "The increasing claim of the state to the
exclusive right to inflict retributory punishments was made in the interest of peace, but
not necessarily of justice." Wolfgang, supra note 13, at 228.
4 8 See 2 F. PoLLAcx & F. MAnr.AND, supra note 14, at 451. "A fine is purely a deter-
rent punishment, a little tainted by revenge." M. FRY, supra note 4, at 121.
49 See 2 W. HOLuswORTr, supra note 5, at 38.
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community than composition or settlement.50 Later legal philosophers
attempted to justify the need for a separate criminal law because
of its deterrent capabilities and its ability to remove dangerous per-
sons from society.51 Whatever the attempted justification, one must
recognize that the modern criminal legal process is an inherently
destructive one because its aim is not to restore the injured party but
to punish the guilty one.
Aside from the inherently destructive nature of the criminal
legal process, there exists a further anomaly in the present crim-
inal law's concept of harm, which has roots in the English king's
system of fines. The essential aim of the present system of criminal
law is the protection of society by a theory of deterrence, removal,
and rehabilitation. To carry out this theory, the state administers a
system of criminal justice composed of policemen, prosecutors,
judges, and custodians, whose major concern is the prevention of
harm to society and not, as one might expect, with harm to indi-
vidual members of that society. 2 If an overview of the present
system of criminal justice does not reinforce that contention, 53 then,
6o Stephen Schafer argues that the fine to the king and the compensative payment
to the victim were necessary because ". . . the twofold payment enabled the offender
to buy back the security that he had lost." S. SCHAFER, supra note 1, at 19. But on the
preceding page, Schafer notes that in earlier times (prior to the exaction of a fine),
if the criminal did not compensate the victim ". . . he lost the protection provided
by his community." Id. at 18. If the effect of non-payment were the same, why the
need for a wite? Maine argues more convincingly that the money paid to the
Roman State was for its time and trouble in settling a dispute. H. MAINE, supra note 7,
at 378. But this could be true only up until the time that the fine completely
replaced the compensative payment.
Pollack and Maitland further point out that the system of composition, including
the bot and the wite may have been "delusive if not hypocritical." 2 F. POLLACK &
F. MAITLAND, supra note 14, at 458. "It outwardly reconciled the stern facts of a rough
justice with Christian reluctance to shed blood; it demanded money instead of life,
but so much that few were likely to pay it." Id. So they argue that the system was
aristocratic. It helped to preserve the distinction between classes because only the
rich could pay the fine; the poor were outlawed or sold as slaves. Id. It is an
interesting theory, not commented upon by other writers, but it seems to indicate that
the penalties set out in the early codes were not fixed. Using the penalty as a
maximum, the body settling the dispute could work out a proper compensative pay-
ment. This is what Diamond means when he says that the early codes were plastic.
A. DiAMOND, supra note 6, at 306.51 See 4 W. BLAcxs'roNE, supra note 35, at 5, 6; SALmOND ON JURisPRUDENcE 115 (G.
Williams ed. 1957). Cf. Goldstein, supra note 44, at 545 (1960).
5243% of the reported crimes are victimless. THE CHALLEN OF CRIME IN A FREE
SOCIETY 20 (1967).
5 3 See J. SKOLNICK, JuSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL (1966).
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for further proof, one need only look at the number of victimless
crimes enacted by legislators and "enforced" by police.54 Some noted
jurisprudential scholars argue that harm to society is a valid standard
for legislative action and a justification for victimless crimes.55 With-
out commenting on the merits of their arguments, and keeping with-
in the framework of the present study on criminal restitution, an
attack will be made on the concept "harm to society" by placing
it in its proper historical perspective.
Initial compensative payments paid to the king were made for the
deaths of foreigners in England under a theory that the king "stood
for" foreigners and was entitled to compensation for their deaths.S6
Later the idea of "standing for" the injured party was carried over
to certain violent, premeditated acts such as murder, hamsocn, and
ambush. Apparently it was felt that violent acts breached the king's
peace; therefore, the king was as much an injured party as the victim
and entitled to a share of the victim's compensationY8 The extension
of this philosophy to cover more and more intentional wrongs to
individuals laid the foundation for the acceptance of harm to the
state as a justification for what later became criminal law.
Gradually the king's compensative share increased as the victim's
diminished, until the entire payment went to the state.59 Once the
state replaced the victim as the recipient of the criminal's compensa-
tive payment, it was a logical next step for the state to replace the
victim as the prosecuting party. This move further deemphasized
harm to the victim and necessarily reinforced the concept of harm
to society, the state's philosophical justification for punishing the
criminal. Tying all of these arguments together, one can see that
54See H.L.A. HART, LAW, LIBERTY & MORALITY 25-27 (1963); SCHUR, supra note 44
at 195-225; THE CHALLENGE OF CRIVM IN A FREE SOCIETY 2, 20 (1967).
55 See P. DEVLIN, THE ENFORCMENT OF MORALS (1965); H.L.A. HART, supra note 54.
Hart does not argue that harm to society is a valid standard to justify victimless
crimes but that for some crimes, the law should take a paternalistic approach. Id. at
33. The result is the same, however. See the excellent discussion of Harts and
Devlin's concept of harm in Private Consensual Adult Behavior: The Requirement of
Harm to Others in the Enforcement of Morality, 14 U.C.L.AL. REv. 581 (1967).
6 M. GLuCxciAN, supra note 19, at 216; 2 F. POLLACK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 14, at
462.
5 7See A. DIAMoND, supra note 6, at 296-97; M. GLUCKMAN, supra note 19, at 216;
2 F. POLLACK & F. MAITLAND, supra 14, at 462.
58W. HounswoRTH, supra note 5, at 38; 2 F. POLLACK & F. MArrLAND, supra note 14.
at 461.
M9 S. SCHAFER, supra note 1, at 19; Wolfgang, supra note 13, at 228.
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as the system of fines narrowed the scope of community composition
and squeezed the victim out of certain proceedings deemed criminal,
the focus of those proceedings shifted to the criminal and his act and
away from harm to the individual. This shift in focus may have re-
suilted in monetary benefits for the king, but it reduced the economic
lot of the victim, shifted the aim of the law away from any construc-
tive policy of restitution, and reinforced the concept of harm to society
to justify the criminalization of certain "harmful" acts to individuals.
II. CimMrAL RESTITUTION TODAY
The panacea for the ills of the criminal justice system is not the re-
creation of a system of restitution to victims of crime, but a well de-
veloped system of restitution which will offer some positive benefits
that the criminal legal process now lacks. It should first be pointed out
that the concept of restitution as used here differs from the term "com-
pensation to victims of crime." Restitution by the criminal to his vic-
tim implies a making whole of the victim, as much as possible, by the
direct action of the criminal.6 Compensation to the victims of crime
involves a monetary payment by the state to those persons injured by
criminal attacks.6' The difference between the two is that compensation
is "an indication of the responsibility of society" to the victim,6n 2 where-
as restitution, while restoring the victim, is also therapeutic and aids in
the rehabilitation of the criminal.68
Those who advocate restitution to victims of crime note the imper-
sonal basis for all criminal justice today and the total lack of remorse
on the part of the criminal for what he has done to his victim. 4 A sys-
tem of restitution, if properly handled, could serve to keep the criminal-
victim relationship alive long after the original offense so as to impress
upon the mind of the criminal that he has injured a human being, not
some impersonal entity known as the state. 5 A system of restitution in
that sense will have as its goal to do something for, not to, the criminal.
In the past with the emphasis of the system of criminal justice on
60 See Eglash, Creative Restitution, 48 J. CRiM. L. C. & P. S. 619 (1958).
61 S. ScHAFER, supra note 1, at 112.
62 Letter from Stephen Schafer, supra note 24, at 10.
63E. SuTaHrERLN & D. CRESSEY, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINOLOGY 278 (5th ed. 1955);
S. ScHAFER, supra note 5, at 125-26.
04 See S. SCA.FER, supra note 5, at 250.
65 S. SCH.AFER, supra note 1, at 127.
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punishment, there was no real attempt at rehabilitation 6 Today, al-
though those administering the dispositionary phase of the system of
criminal justice are pushing toward a goal of rehabilitation, they find
themselves frustrated by the present penal system. 7 Custody conflicts
with rehabilitation, if for no other reason than that the former forces
a man to adjust to prison society while the latter encourages him to learn
to adjust to a different "normal" society.6 One benefit of a meaningful
system of restitution is that it would keep the criminal within the nor-
mal society and thus prevent him from having to adjust to prison
society. At the same time, it would allow the offender to support him-
self and his family. Furthermore, if the criminal were able to continue'
working, restitutionary payments to the victim would be more of a
reality than the victim's present civil suit for damages.
Albert Eglash advocates the use not only of restitution, but creative
restitution, where the position of both victim and criminal is not the
same, but better than before the offense was committed.69 Eglash recog-
nizes those situations where restitution in kind would be far more thera-
peutic than a monetary payment to the victim, if the restitutionary act
is related to the destructive act. ° In psychological terms, Eglash thinks
that "[b]y being in kind, restitution provides a substitute outlet for the
same conscious needs and unconscious emotional conflicts which moti-
vated the offense." 7' For creative restitution to work effectively, the
offender must participate in determining an appropriate step to take,
the beginning of a growth process for the offender." "While punish-
ment can increase fear-motivation, guidance and restitution increase the
capacity for choice and this may bring release to an impulse-ridden
individual." '
Stephen Schafer, the leading advocate of criminal restitution, sup-
ports Eglash's theory of creative restitution because it corresponds with
his own theory of responsibility. Schafer views punishment as the en-
66 See Seliger, Toward a Realistic Reorganization of the Penitentiaries, 60 J. CRIM.
L.C. & P.S. 47, 48 (1969).
07See McCleery, The Governmental Process & Informal Social Control, in:-rT
PmrsoN-STuDIEs rN INSMrrur=OAL ORGAMNZATION & CHANGE (D. Cressey ed. 1961);
Seliger, supra note 66, at 48.8 See G. SYKFs, THE Soc=r¢ OF CAPTIVES (1965).
69 Eglash, supra note60, at 620.
70 Id.
71 Id. -
721d.
731Id. at 622.
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forcement of responsibility, 74 with responsibility defined here as answer-
ability or culpability. Punishment is one-sided; it holds the criminal
responsible for violating the rules of society, but it does not hold those
responsible who fail to teach the criminal respect for the legal threat
of punishment, nor does punishment hold the criminal responsible to
the victim."5 Schafer argues that restitution will have a dual effect on
responsibility. The "... . criminal is called to account not only for vio-
lating the rules of his own societal responsibility, but also that he may
restore his victim's potential functional responsibility." 76
All that has been said up to this point has been about the positive
benefits of a system of criminal restitution to the offender. The bene-
fits to the victim are obvious. Except in those states that have compen-
sation plans for victims of crime,77 the victim continues to suffer to
expedite justice for the criminal.78 The victim may never receive com-
pensation for his injury, for he is thought to derive a vicarious thrill from
seeing the criminal punished.7 9 If the stolen property is a necessary
exhibit for the prosecution, the victim will not have the use of his goods
until the proceedings are over. And, of course, to prevent the victim
from attempting to circumvent the system of criminal justice, statutes
have been passed to prevent him from compounding a crime.80 Crim-
inal restitution, in focusing on both the needs of the criminal and the
victim, would go a long way toward balancing the scales of justice.
While the theoretical underpinnings of a system of restitution are
appealing, there are practical considerations involved in the implementa-
tion of such a program that must be considered. First of all, there are
manpower considerations, especially for people to supervise restitu-
tionary payments in dnd. Not only will this involve numerous people,
but they must be highly qualified if the program is to have any mean-
ing. If the person supervising the criminal becomes vindictive, then the
74 S. SCHAFER, THEORIES IN CRIMINOLOGY 292 (1969).
75 Id. at 6, 7.
70 S. SCHAFER, supra note 1, at 152.
77CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 11211 (West 1966); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 258A,
S 1-7 (1967); N.Y. ExEc. CODE § 620-35 (McKinney 1967).
78 S. SCHAFER, supra note 5, at 117.
79 "In these gross and atrocious injuries the private wrong is swallowed up in the
public: we seldom hear any mention made of satisfaction to the individual, the satis-
faction to the community being so very great." W. BLAcESTONE, supra note 35, at 6.
S. Schafer, Restitution to Victims of Crime-An Old Correctional Aim Modernized,
50 MIN. L. REv. 243, 244 (1965).
80 See p. 96 & notes 101-02 infra.
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system will be little better than the work gangs now in operation in
some parts of the country. Secondly, in those situations where the
criminal is to make a monetary payment to the victim, what is to pre-
vent the criminal from leaving the jurisdiction and effectively thwarting
the scheme of creative restitution? Thirdly, is restitution an appropriate
remedy in serious offenses? Fourthly, do the criminal courts have the
manpower and the time to make a determination of payment? There
are no easy answers to any of these questions, and for this reason, legis-
latures find it more expedient to establish a system of victim compen-
sation and leave the theory of restitution to sociological and jurispru-
dential debate.
Yet despite all the difficulties involved in implementing a system of
creative restitution, despite all the coercive techniques of the law to
prevent a settlement between the victim and his criminal, despite all
the platitudes enunciated by the courts establishing the principle that
restitution by the criminal is no defense to a later prosecution,," today
restitution is very much alive in the system of criminal justice at the
administrative and adjudicatory levels. This article will explore the
present system of restitution in the United States, discuss its imple-
mentation, and expose its weaknesses and strengths.
A. Pre-Administrative Level
Research disclosed few studies of restitution at the pre-administrative
level, i.e., prior to police intervention, but it is generally recognized that
restitution occurs most often at this stage.82 It is not uncommon for
parents to pay for damage wrought by their children on a neighbor's
house, car, children, etc. It is also not uncommon for some store owners
to allow small children to take items from their shelves and then call
the parents and bill them for the item. 3 This leaves the parent with
the responsibility of punishing the child, and it also helps in main-
taining goodwill for the store. These everyday occurrences are not con-
sidered crimes, however, either because children are involved, or more
likely, because the parties are friendly and can settle their disputes with-
out resorting to the courts. There are advantages to pre-administrative
81 E.g., State v. Baxter, 89 Ohio St. 209, 104 N.E. 331 (1914); Meadowcroft v. People,
163 IlL. 56, 45 N.E. 991 (1896).
82 E. SurrERLAND & D. CRESSEY, supra note 63, at 278; Miller, The Compromise of
Criminal Cases, 1 S. CAL. L. REv. 1, 2, 3 (1927).8 Personal experience.
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restitution because it is quick and does not tie the courts or the parties
up over a minor dispute. There may be disadvantages, however, if the
child thinks his parents can buy off a neighbor or store owner, or if
the parent fails to admonish the child for his illegal activity.
Research did disclose that a type of restitution has been a common
practice in cases involving stolen goods which are insured; the most
common examples involve theft from banks and jewelry businesses.8
The practice is for the criminal to "sell" the stolen property to the
insurance company for a small sum.85 He does this because if he sold
it to a "fence," he would receive relatively little for it; and, by selling
it to the insurance company, the criminal does not fear prosecution."6
The insurance company recognizes that their loss might be substantial
if the goods are not returned, so they encourage the criminal to return
the goods in return for a small payment and a refusal to prosecute.7 This
practice is actually not restitution in the true sense,"" and despite its
practical application, its harmful consequences are obvious-encourage-
ment rather than discouragement of illegal activity.
B. Administrative Level
At the administrative level, restitution is sanctioned by private detec-
tives, police officers, intake clerks, and prosecutors. Most large depart-
ment stores have a number of plain clothes detectives who find it less
time-consuming to force shoplifters to return the goods within the
confines of the store than to take the shoplifters to court.89 One of these
private agencies has a policy of taking the shoplifter's name and giv-
ing him a severe reprimand.90 These names are kept on file, and if the
shoplifter later attempts to get a job in a store protected by the de-
tective agency, he will find no position available for him."' The ad-
84 Note, Restitution & The Criminal Law, 39 COLUM. L. REV. 1185, 1200 (1939).
8 5 Id. at 1202.
86 Id.
87Id.
8 8 Because the goods are not returned to the injured party. Yet the insurance
company is an "aggrieved party" under 18 U.S.C.A. § 3651 (1964).89 Interview with Lt. Lawrence Quinlan, Commanding Juvenile Aid Section, Boston
Police Dep't. in Boston, Mass., November 12, 1969. This is not the policy of the
Retail Trade Board, however. Interview with William L. Phipps, Executive Secretary,
Retail Trade Board of Boston, in Boston, Mass., March 9, 1970.90oInterview with Charles Johnson, Chief of Security Detectives for Zayre's Cam-
bridge, in Cambridge, Mass., February 2, 1970.
91d. This may be the practice of a single store. Interview with William L. Phipps.
supra note 89.
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vantages of a speedy return of the goods at this level are outweighed by,
the disadvantages to the shoplifter. If a young person is caught shop-
lifting, a reprimand and a return of the goods would not be a sufficient
penalty. His parents should be informed because they may know
nothing of the youth's activities, and this may force them to take more
of an interest in their child. Furthermore, the taking of names and
their later use as a job blacklist introduces legal problems of a con-
stitutional nature.
At the police level, restitution is a routine part of the policeman's
job. When a policeman gets notice of a recent burglary, he may go to
several pawn shops to look for the stolen items and put a stop order
on their sale to effectuate a later restoration of the property. 2 The po-
lice officer also acts as a mediator in minor disputes between parties, but
he will never collect money from one party and pay it to another.93
Sometimes the officer reports that restitution has been made and the
complaint dismissed. This is rare, however, and usually a notation of
restitution on an arrest report appears after a hearing has been held
before the intake clerk. At this level, restitution can be made for serious
offenses, as the following on a juvenile's arrest sheet shows: "D punched
R in the face, knocking out one tooth and loosening two others that
had to be removed. Hearing in W.R. Court. Clerk did not issue a
complaint upon agreement of D to pay medical costs for partial plate-
$70. Complainant then withdrew charge and agreed to $50 restitution."
The advantages of a scheme of restitution at the police level include
the benefits of immediate payment to the victim and practical benefits
to the police force. In Boston, 5,906 complaints involving juveniles were
processed by the Juvenile Aid Section of the Boston Police Depart-
ment, but only 2,951 persons were arrested.94 If the police did not em-
ploy a system of restitution, much more of their time would be spent
in court for trials involving minor offenses. The disadvantages of
restitution at the police level pertain to the entire system of criminal
justice. Allowing a policeman to mediate a dispute places too much
discretion in untrained hands. There are no criteria to guide the police-
man in determining when or what kind of restitution should be ordered,
nor is there an adversary proceeding to determine the exact amount of
the victim's loss. Without proper training and necessary criteria, the
92 Note, Restitution & The Criminal Law, supra note 84, at 1188.
93 Interview with Lt. Lawrence Quinlan, supra note 89.
94 Juvenile Aid Section, Boston Police Dep't, Annual Report-1968.
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police officer is a poor substitute for most judges, and the officer may
find himself dispensing justice only to those who can afford it. De-
spite these disadvantages, and despite the criticism of police settlement
by those at the court level,9 5 restitution at the police level will continue
as a practice while the present system of criminal justice is in operation
because it is a practical necessity and because the average person finds
it an acceptable and purposive practice. 96
In Boston, Massachusetts, the clerk of court holds an informal hear-
ing after the criminal's arrest to determine if the person should be held
for trialY7 If at this stage all the parties are present, the clerk may
order restitution to be made to the injured party.98 There are advantages
to restitution at this level because all the parties are present; the clerk's
actions will tend to be more uniform than the policeman on the beat;
and the settlement is quick and removes some of the case load off the
courts. At the prosecution level, restitution is practiced,99 but probably
to a lesser degree than at any other administrative level. Generally,
prosecutors who are extremely busy are susceptible to plea bargains, and
restitution will therefore play a part in the dismissal of minor offenses,
especially if there is court approval. 100 Restitution at the prosecutorial
level should not be encouraged, however, for expediency is no substi-
tute for uniformity of treatment.
C. Adjudicatory Level
In practically every jurisdiction in the United States, if a serious crime
has been committed, it is a felony for one party to receive anything
of value from another on an agreement not to prosecute such crime.
Some states do not distinguish between serious and non-serious of-
fenses;' others reduce the penalty for compounding a non-serious of-
95 Interview with Louis G. Maglio, Chief Probation Officer, Boston Juvenile Court,
In Boston, November 14, 1969; Interview with Francis G. Poitrast, Chief Judge,
Boston Juvenile Court, in Boston, November 12, 1969.
96See Fuller, supra note 24, at 339.
97 Interview with Judge Francis G. Poitrast, supra note 95.
98d.
9 9 See S. KADISH & M. PAULSEN, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES 1068 (2d ed.
1969); Note, Restitution & the Criminal Law, supra note 84, at 1189-90.
10o The compromise of misdemeanors is allowed by statute in some jurisdictions. See
note 103, infra.
'0ARp. STATS. ANN. § 41-2813 (1964); LA. REv. STATS. S 14:131 (1968); N.J. STATS.
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fense,'0 2 and still others allow the compromise of misdemeanors under
court supervision,10 3 or allow the injured party to get his goods back.10 4
The crime of seduction is unique because, although most statutes are
not explicit on this point, a subsequent marriage of the victim to the
criminal is a bar to criminal proceedings for seduction, even if the
marriage only lasts for a day.105 This is not because the marriage is a
restitutionary act, but rather because it fulfills the criminal's seductive
promise and removes one of the common law elements of the offense.1'6
On the other hand, marriage of the victim to the criminal is no defense
to a statutory rape proceeding,10 7 with some exceptions, 08  but the
courts do take the marriage into consideration in sentencing the defend-
ant.0 9 Aside from the crime of seduction, restitution is rarely con-
sidered a bar to a criminal prosecution, but there are interesting excep-
tions to this general rule.
ANw. § 2A:97-1 (1952); N.M. STATS. ANN. § 40A-22-6 (1953); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-1-5
(1956); W. VA. CODE ANN § 615-19 (1966).
l02 Ar. CODE § 14-98 (1958); ALASKA CODE CRAM. PROC. § 11.30.190 (1962); ARmz. REv.
STATS. ANN. § 13-321 (1956); CAL. PENAL CODE § 7-153 (West 1966); FLA. STATS. ANN.
§ 44-843.14 (1965); IDAHO GEN. LAWS ANN. § 18-1601 (1947); hD. RE V. STATS. ANN.
§ 10-1001 (1965); IoWA CODE ANN. §§ 722.1, 722.2 (1969); KANSAS STATS. ANN. §§ 21-714,
715 (1964); MICH. Coip. LAWS ANN. § 740.149 (1967); Miss. CODE ANN. H§ 2033, 34
(1942); MONT. REV. CODE § 94-3535 (1947); NEV. REv. STATS. § 199.290 (1967); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 12-17-11 (1960); OKLA. STATS. ANN. § 21-543 (1951); ORE. REV. STATS.
§ 462.310 (1968); SD. Comp. LAws § 22-3-6 (1967); TEN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-3101 tO
-3103 (1955); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-28-58 (1953); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.1-303 (1960);
WASH. REv. CODE § 9.69.090 (1961); Wyo. STATS. ANN. § 6-158-59 (1957).
103 ARrz. REv. STATS. ANN. § 13-1591 (1956); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1377-79 (West 1966);
IDAHO GEN. LAws ANN. § 19-3401 (1947); Ky. REv. STATS. § 432.200 (1962); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ch. 276 § 55 (1932); MicH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 28.937-40 (1967); MONT. REv.
,CODE § 94-9401 (1947); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 29-01-16, 29-01-07 (1960); OKLA. STATS.
ANN. § 22-1291 (1951); ORE. REv. STATS. § 134-010 (1968); S.D. Comp. LAWS § 23-33-1
(1967); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.1-18 (1960); WASH. REv. CODE § 10.22.018 (1964).
104 CoL. REv. STATS. § 40-7-34 (1963); NEB. REv. STAT. § 28-709 (1943); N.Y. PENAL
'CODE § 215.45 (McKinney 1967); Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 2917.36 (1968); Wis. STATS.
ANN. § 946.67 (1957).
105 People v. Gould, 70 Mich. 240,93 N.W. 338 (1888).
1o Id. at 245, 93 N.W. at 342.
loTSee State v. DeJean, 159 La. 900, 106 So. 374 (1925); COmmonwealth v.
Slattery, 147 Mass. 423, 18 NE. 399 (1888).
"
10s See D. NEWMAN, CONVICTIoN-THE DETERMINATION OF GUILT OR INNOCENCE
WriHoT TRIAL 64 (1966).
100See State v. Newcomer, 59 Kan. 668, 54 P. 685 (1898); Huckaby v. State, 94
Okla. Crim. 29, 229 P.2d 235 (1951).
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D. Restitution Not as a Condition of Probation
In Holsey v. State, °0 the defendant, a stable hand, borrowed one of
the stable owner's horses without permission. When the defendant re-
turned with the horse, the owner confronted him with the choice of
receiving a whipping or paying for the horse. In the words of the court,
"[t] he defendant chose the latter horn of the dilemma and bought the
horse on satisfactory terms." "' The defendant then had this prose-
cution brought against him for violating a statute making it a crime to
ride another's horse without his permission. The Georgia Supreme Court
held that when anyone violates the statute in question, and the owner later
consents to the act prior to the institution of criminal proceedings, no
prosecution will lie. The court's reasoning ignored the usual arguments
against compromising offenses and held that where one party interferes
with the property of another, the injured party can waive the wrong
and treat the taker as a purchaser." 2
Although the Holsey case makes interesting reading, it may be the
only case allowing restitution as a bar to a later criminal proceeding
where there is no statute allowing for the compromise of misdemeanors.
Yet courts do order restitution to victims of crimes as part of the dis-
positionary proceedings of a criminal trial under broad probation statutes
or specific provisions in those statutes allowing restitution or reparation
to injured parties.'" Judicial attempts to fine the defendant and
allocate the money to aid the victim have not met with success." 4
E. Restitution in Juvenile Probation
Restitution as a condition of probation involves either a monetary
payment or a payment in kind, i.e., services. Payments in kind, an idea
closely akin to Eglash's concept of creative restitution, occur most fre-
quently in juvenile courts." 5 Some juvenile court judges use the tech-
1104 Ga. App. 453, 61 S.E. 836 (1908).
111 Id. at 454, 61 S.E. at 837.
112 Id.
1 3 See statutes cited notes 127-29 infra.
114See Lancaster v. State, 83 Ga. App. 746, 64 S.E.2d 902 (1951); Smith v. Barrow,
21 Ga. App. 650, 94 S.E. 860 (1918).
115 Most State statutes providing for juvenile probation give broad discretionary
power to the juvenile court judge to define the conditions of probation. ALAsKA
WELF. & INST. STATS. ANN. § 47.10-080 (1962); AiZ. REv. STATS. ANN. § 8-231(2) (b)
(1956); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE tit. 7 § 725 (1966); GA. CODE ANN. § 24-2421 (1958);
IDAHO GEN. LAWS ANN. § 16-1814 (1947); ILL. ANN. STATS. ch. 37 § 705-2 (1934);
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nique far more than others, and it is apparently a more approved type
of penalty than monetary restitution, in the eyes of the social work staff
attached to the juvenile court."" It is often used for minor offenses,
for example, if a youth is convicted of ringing a false alarm, he may
be told to clean fire equipment on weekends. Restitution in kind may
also be an alternative to monetary payment, but this generally fails in
its purpose because the youth's parents will usually pay the amount
claimed rather than see their child work off his penalty. 17 One of the
reasons why juvenile court judges hesitate to order restitution in kind
is due to the criticism they receive from the public, not because child
labor is involved, but because some state employees are deprived of
work.1 8 Despite this criticism, restitution in kind is an accepted part of
the sentencing procedure in juvenile courts, not only in the United
States, but in other countries as well.
Both in England and Germany, restitution is often ordered as a con-
dition of probation in the juvenile courts."9 The German Juvenile
Court system is well known for its use of "role reversal" as a sen-
tencing device.120 The device was pioneered by Dr. Karl Holzschuch
who attempted to place the offender as much as possible in the shoes of
the victim.' 2' Holszchuch used this method for all types of offenses,
whereas in the United States, restitution in kind is rare and limited to
minor offenses.1' Monetary restitution is used far more frequently by
juvenile court judges in the United States, and for serious offenses.
In juvenile proceedings, where the actor is often tried as well as his
act, restitution as a condition of probation seems a necessary part of
that court's structure. The machinery is there to implement a recon-
ciliation between the parties because the proceedings are somewhat
IND. STATS. ANN. § 9-3215 (Burns 1965); IowA CODE ANN. § 232.34 (1969); Ky. REv.
STATS. S 208.200 (1962); LA. REv. STATS. § 13:1580 (1968); MD. CODE ANN. § 70-24
(1957); MoNr. REv. CoDE § 10-611 (1947); NEV. REv. STATS. § 62.200 (1967); N.H. REv.
STATS. § 169:14 (1955); NJ. STATS. Au"t¢. S 2A:4-37 (1952); N.C. GEN. STATS. § 110-32
(1965); OxLA. STATs. ANN,. tit. 10 § 1116 (1951); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 14-1-33 (1956);
S.C. CODE § 15-1151 (1962); Wis. REv. STATS. ANNs. § 57.01 (1957).
110 Interview with Louis G. Maglio, supra note 95.
117 Interview with Judge Francis G. Poitrast, supra note 95.
18 Id.
119 See Overland & Newhouse, Juvenile Criminal Law in the Federal Republic of
Germany & in England, 4 CALip. W.L. REv. 35 (1968).
201 d. at 39.121 Id.
22 Interview with Judge Francis G. Poitrast, supra note 95; Interview with Max 0.
Laster, Judge, Juvenile & Domestic Relations Court of Richmond, Virginia.
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more informal than in adult court, and the philosophy of the juvenile
court staff, from police officer to judge, is one designed to help the
juvenile, not to punish him.123 Yet within the mechanism of the juve-
nile court, there is no provision for a type of creative restitution that
will keep the criminal-victim relationship alive. Monetary restitution, if
paid, is collected by the probation officer, usually from the juvenile's
parents. 124 Restitution in kind usually involves a service performed by
the juvenile for the state-a totally impersonal act. In short, the juve-
nile court, with its social work staff, judges, police officers and attorneys
dedicated to rehabilitation, has failed to test the theory of creative
restitution in an atmosphere that would lend itself to such a test.125 Pos-
sibly the court fears being labelled a super-parent, but it has acceded to
that status anyway in its attempts to handle stubborn children, runa-
ways, and truants. There are probably innumerable reasons why a dy-
namic program of creative restitution has not been implemented, but
if the juvenile court is dedicated to a goal of rehabilitation, serious con-
sideration should be given to such a program.
F. Restitution in Adult Probation
Probation as a relatively recent addition to the system of criminal
justice advances the concept of rehabilitation over punishment. 126 Most
state statutes providing for probation fall in three categories as to the
conditions thereof. Some statutes simply give the court the power to
place the defendant on probation on conditions specified by the court,
presumably for the best interest of the criminal.2 7 Other statutes spe-
cifically set out certain conditions, not necessarily exclusive nor clearly
defined, to guide the court in formulating a probation decree. 128 A third
123 Interview with Lt. Lawrence Quinlan, supra note 89; Interview with Judge
Francis G. Poitrast, supra note 95.
124 Interview with Louis G. Maglio, supra note 95.
125 See K. MENNINGER, THE CRIME OF PUNISHMENT 230 (1968).
126 Massachusetts had the first probation statute. MAss. ACTs ch. 198 (1878).
1 27 ALA. CODE § 42-22 (1958); ALASKA STATS. ANN. § 12.55.100(2) (1962); ARIz. REV-
STATS. ANN. § 13-1657 (1956); DEL. CODE ANN. § 11-4321 (1953); MISS. CODE ANN.
§ 4004-221 (1942); MONT. REv. CODE § 94-9830 (1947); NEV. REV. STATS. § 176.185
(1967); N.H. REV. STATS. § 504.1 (1953); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-53-13 (1960); Oma
REv. CODE ANN. § 2951.02 (1968); S.D. CoMP. LAws § 23-57-4 (1962); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 77-35-17 (1953).
128 CAL. WEua. & INST. CODE § 1203.1 (West 1966); CoLO. REV. STATS. § 39-16-7
(1963); GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2711 (1933); Ky. REV. STATS. § 439.290 (1962); MASS. GENq.
LAws ANN. § 92 (1959); MICH. CoMp. LAWS ANN. § 771.3 (1967); N.J. STATs. ANN.
§ 2A:168-2 (1952); N.M. STATS. ANN. § 41-17-36 (1953); N.Y. EXEc. CODE § 15-199
[Vol. 5:71
CRIMINAL RESTITUTION
and smaller group of statutes lists appropriate conditions of probation
and defines the outer limits of the probation decree. 2 9 In general, courts
consider probation a privilege rather than a right, and once they have
made this nebulous distinction, they usually uphold any restitutionary
condition placed on the defendant. 130 The defendant naturally has the
alternative of going to jail if he dislikes the conditions of his proba-
tion. Aside from this questionable judicial logic, there are a number of
cases involving restitution as a condition of probation where the court's
decisions raise serious questions as to the use of probation as a vehicle
for restitution to victims of crime. Some of these cases will be set out
here to define three problem areas in the use of the present system of
probation as a restitutionary device.
Early cases in which lower court judges ordered restitution as a con-
dition of probation clearly depict an initial problem in the use of
restitution as a compensatory device totally unrelated to the act for
which the defendant was convicted. In an early case in New York,'' a
defendant who failed to support his wife was adjudged a disorderly
person, placed on probation and ordered to make weekly support pay-
ments to his wife. In Georgia, a defendant, who was convicted of
fornication and sentenced to hard labor, was told that he could serve
this sentence outside of the chain gang if he paid $400 quarterly for
support of the baby.' 2 In a recent case in California,1 33 the defendant
was convicted of grand theft because he was living with a welfare re-
cipient and concealed his presence from the welfare authorities. As a
condition of probation, the defendant and the welfare recipient were
ordered to restore $1,685 to the State treasury, and the defendant was
ordered to assume financial support of the welfare recipient's child.134
(McKinney 1967); OREGoN REv. STATs. § 137.540 (1968); S.C. CoDE § 55-593 (1962);
VA. CODE ANN. § 53-274 (1967); WASH. REv. CODE § 9.92.060 (1961); W. VA. Co~z
ANN. § 62-12-9 (1966); Wyo. STAs. ANN. § 7-315 (1957).
129ARK. STATS. ANN. S 43-2331 (1969); FLA. STATS. ANN. § 46-948.04 (1965); IND.
STATS. ANN. § 9-2210 (Burns 1965); KAN. STATS. ANN. § 62-2241 (1964); MD. ANN.
CoDE § 71A (1957); R.. GL-r. LAws § 12-19-8 (1956); Wis. REv. STATs. Av . § 57.61
(1957).
'
3 0 See People v. Good, 287 Mich. 110, 282 NW. 920 (1938); Conditions of Probation
Imposed on Wisconsin Felons: Costs of Prosecution & Restitution, 1962 Wis. L. REv.
672.
131 City of New York v. Kriegel, 124 Misc. 67, 207 N.Y.S. 640 (1924);
132 Swanson v. State, 38 Ga. App. 386, 144 S.E. 49 (1928).
133 People v. Flores, 197 Cal. App. 2d 611, 17 Cal. Rptr. 382 (1961).
134 Id. at 613, 17 Cal. Rptr. at 385.
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In spite of California's restrictive statute on probation, 3" the Cali-
fornia court, more than any other, has attempted to extend the outer
limits of restitution as a condition'of probation. In People v. Williams, 3 '
the defendant Williams entered the victim's store and attempted to make
some purchases with a Diners' Club card. The victim, after checking
the number on the card, kept it and refused to extend credit to Wil-
liams. Whereupon the defendant retrieved the card by threatening the
victim with a pair of scissors. Williams was convicted of assault with
a deadly weapon and was ordered to make $3,000 restitution to the
Diners' Club for a debt he owed them. On appeal, the California court
held the condition void because it was too far removed from the of-
fense for which Williams was convicted.
Following TVilliams the California court was faced with a more un-
usual case in People v. Miller.37 The defendant Miller operated a con-
struction company and he was convicted of unlawfully taking $820
from the Keefe family. As a condition of probation, Miller was or-
dered to make restitution to the Keefes, and the court hoped he would
also make restitution to other parties he had defrauded. During the
criminal prosecution, Miller was adjudicated a bankrupt, and a list of
creditors from the bankruptcy proceedings was submitted to the lower
court on a memorandum prepared by Miller's probation officer, with
a request that the defendant pay $8,600 in restitution. The court, with-
out a hearing, accepted the memorandum, and a hearing was held on
the probation officer's request to extend probation. During the hearing
Miller argued against extension contending that he had made restitu-
tion of $1,575, but the court extended the probation period. The Su-
preme Court of California held that the order of restitution was proper,
even though it was not limited to the direct consequences of the acts
for which Miller had been convicted. Since payment of all of Miller's
customers can help his rehabilitation, argued the court, and since the
harm to all the customers was similar to that suffered by the Keefes,
the condition of restitution did not have that element of remoteness
found in the Williams case. 38
In Miller, the California court equated reparation with restitution,
as a proper condition of probation. Some writers view this as an ap-
135 CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE tit. 7, § 1203.1 (West 1966).
136 247 Cal. App. 2d 394, 55 Cal. Rptr. 550 (1966).
137 256 Cal. App. 2d 348, 64 Cal. Rptr. 20 (1967), voted in 16 U.C.L.A. REv. 456
(1969).
138 256 Cal. App. 2d 348, 356, 64 Cal. Rptr. 20, 25 (1967).
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propriate use of the probation system,'" but most courts disagree'.- In
People v. Good,140 the Michigan court reversed the lower court's order"
of restitution, but split on the issue of compensation. The lower court
found the defendant guilty of felonious homicide when his negligent
driving resulted in the death of a pedestrian. As a condition of pro-
bation, restitution of $385 was ordered by the court. The defendant
refused to pay, claiming that the order violated the Due Process clause
of the Federal and State Constitutions because he did. not have a hear-
ing on damages, nor is a criminal proceeding an appropriate forum
for a hearing on damages. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Michigan
held that there was no violation of the defendant's constitutional rigfits
because an order of restitution is not an assessment of damages.' 4 The
court further noted that the defendant was not deprived of any rights,
"4... rather he was given the additional privilege of avoiding the usual
penalty of his crime by the payment of a sum of money... ," 142 Judge
Wiest, concurring, raised no constitutional objections, but he felt .that
the order to pay money for someone's death went beyond the Michigan
statutory provision providing for restitution not reparation. 43
Almost twenty years later, Judge Wiest's distinction between restitu-
tion and reparation surfaced in People v. Becker. 44 In Becker, the Su-
preme Court of Michigan was faced with a lower court conviction for
leaving the scene of an accident and an order of restitution amounting to
$1,244 for payment of hospital costs to the parties injured in the col-
lision. Here the court vacated the order because it violated the Due
Process clause of both the Michigan and United States Constitutions.
In distinguishing this case from their earlier decision in Good, the court
drew a theoretical distinction between restitution and reparation and a
factual distinction between leaving the scene and felonious homicide.
By definition, the court argued, restitution means a return of something
taken, and reparation, the undoing of something done. 45 Assuming,
however, said the court, that a restitution order for unliquidated damages
139 Mueller, Criminal Law & Administration, 34 N.Y.U.L. RE:v. 82, 111 (1958); Use
of Restitution in the Criminal Process: People v. Miller, 16 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 456, 465
(1969).
140 287 Mich. 110, 282 N.TV. 920 (1938).
.41 Id. at 115, 282 N.W. at 923.
142 Id.
1431d. at 119, 282 N.W. at 927.
144 349 Mich. 476, 84 N.W.2d 833 (1957).
145 Id. at 483, 84 N.W.2d at 840.
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might be a valid condition of probation, an order of restitution may "....
be imposed only for loss caused by the very offense for which the defend-
ant was tried and convicted." 146 In the case of felonious homicide the
restitutionary order related to the conviction because payment was for
the death of a pedestrian and death resulted from the offense. Here,
however, the charge was leaving the scene of an accident, and the
damages resulted from hitting the pedestrian, not leaving the scene.
The Becker opinion clearly limits a decree of restitution to the harm
committed, but it fails to establish criteria to determine the proper
restitutionary amount where unliquidated damages are alleged in a
criminal proceeding. To resolve this dilemma, most federal courts re-
quire that the order of restitution be limited to actual damages or loss
suffered. Three federal circuit courts have overruled orders for the
payment of restitution where the order encompassed offenses listed in
the indictment but not proved in court. In a case before the ninth cir-
cuit,147 the 'defendant was charged with seventeen offenses for forging
certain papers needed for veterans' home loan guaranty benefits, and
he was found guilty of six offenses. As a condition of probation, the
defendant was ordered to make restitution to the seventeen veterans
named in the indictment and one veteran not named. On appeal, the
court held that the order of restitution to pay those other than the
six whom the defendant was found guilty of defrauding was void. To
the same effect was a case decided by the Fourth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals, 14 where the defendant was ordered to pay $32,000 in back in-
come taxes, yet there were not enough facts in the record to determine
the exact amount the defendant owed. The court remanded.
State courts which have been faced with a similar problem, without
a statutory guide, have generally held that statutes providing for resti-
tution can apply only to the amount which the defendant admits to,
or for which he was convicted. A good example of this is a Wisconsin
case149 where the defendant was convicted of defrauding a company of
350 dollars and was ordered to pay 11,700 dollars in restitution. On ap-
peal, the court remanded for a new determination because it was un-
clear from the record as to what the defendant had admitted.'50
The preceding cases define two interrelated problem areas in the
146 Id. at 486, 84 N.W.2d at 842.
147 Karrell v. United States, 181 F.2d 981 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 891 (1950).
148 United States v. Taylor, 305 F.2d 183 (4th Cir. 1962).
149 State v. Scherr, 9 Wis. 2d 418, 101 N.W.2d 77 (1960).
'm Id. at 427-28, 101 N.W.2d at 80.
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use of probation as a restitutionary device. First, by what standard does
one measure the relationship of the order of restitution: the harm com-
mitted or the conviction obtained? Second, is the present criminal pro-
ceeding an appropriate forum to determine the amount of restitution
to be paid by the criminal to his victim? The second question is ex-
tremely difficult and has not been satisfactorily answered by the courts.
The first question has been dealt with, and at least certain criteria have
been established to guide the lower court judge in ordering restitution.
One of the earliest cases requiring a link between the conviction ob-
tained and the order of restitution is State v. Barnett.1' 1 In 1929, Barnett
was convicted of leaving the scene of an accident, and placed on pro-
bation with the condition that he pay 1,500 dollars as restitution to the
injured parties. In 1931, the defendant had paid 1,080 dollars and asked
that he be discharged. In 1937, the court ordered the defendant to pay
the remaining 440 dollars owed, and Barnett refused. With the money
unpaid in 1938, Barnett's probation was revoked for non-payment and
drunkenness, and he was sentenced to two years in prison. On appeal,
the defendant claimed that continuing probation for nine years for
the offense of leaving the scene of an accident was contrary to the re-
habilitative aims of the statute on probation. 152 Without deciding this
issue, the Supreme Court of Vermont ordered the restitutionary condi-
tion vacated because a conviction for leaving the scene cannot give
rise to ain order to pay restitution for injuries arising out of an ac-
cident.""8
The Vermont court was obviously swayed by the length of probation
served by the defendant for a minor offense, yet it pointedly refused
to come to grips with this issue. A case from Michigan 54 clearly shows
the importance of setting a maximum time period for a probation de-
cree. The Michigan defendant was convicted of felonious operation
of an automobile and placed on probation for three years. The two
injured parties later obtained a civil judgnient against the defendant for
21,000 dollars, which judgment was not satisfied three and a half years
after the conviction. At that time, the defendant's probation officer
petitioned the court to extend probation an additional two years. The
court acquiesced and the defendant paid 5,000 dollars in restitution to
'1' 110 Vt..221, 3 A.2d 521 (1939).
152 Id. at 227, 3 A.2d at 524.
1RId. at 232, 3 A.2d at 526.
15 4 People v. Marks, 340 Mich. 485, 65 N.W.2d-698 (1954).
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [
the victims. On appeal, the action of extending the period of probation
was held not an abuse of discretion.'v
In reviewing the cases requiring restitution as a condition of proba-
tion, one can easily recognize that the machinery set up is very flexible
and aimed more towards compensating the injured party than in re-
habilitating the criminal. This is a meritorious ideal, but it does not
follow from this that the present criminal legal process, with all of its
inequities, must be the procedure used to achieve it. Under a thriving
system of creative restitution as advocated by Eglash and Schafer,"5 6
there would be little objection voiced by this writer if the probation
procedures now used were adopted in carrying out a decree of restitu-
tion. Yet the dispositionary stage of a criminal proceeding is still part
of a basically punitive scheme, and, therefore, some procedural safe-
guards must be established to protect the rights of one convicted of a
crime.
III. RECOMMENDED SAFEGUARDS
One writer has suggested the following standard:
Restitution as a condition of probation is proper if it requires the
payment of fixed liabilities: (1) incurred as the proximate result of
the criminal act for which the probationer was convicted, or (2)
incurred as the result of conduct which is substantially related in kind,
including the state of mind of the actor, to the breach for which the
individual was criminally convicted.157
This is in substance the test used by the California court in People v.
Miller, supra, but under the present system of criminal justice it is too
broad. For liquidated damages, the order of restitution must be limited
to a return of the items taken or the actual out-of-pocket expenses in-
curred by the injured party.-58 Unliquidated damages must be admitted
by the defendant or documented during the criminal proceeding as
evidence of the harm suffered by the victim."5 9 Furthermore, the injury
must be causally connected to the crime for which the defendant is
155 Id. at 501, 65 N.W.2d at 703.
156 See discussion p. 81 & 82 supra.
157 Use of Restitution in the Crhinal Process, supra note 139, at 474.
158 Note, Restitution & the Criminal Law, supra note 84, at 1197.
159The necessity for this safeguard should be obvious. The present criminal pro-
cedure is not the proper forum for a hearing on damages. If, on the other hand, there
is no hearing but a judge-made decision, based on a probation officer's report, then
there are due process considerations. See Hink, The Application of Constitutional
Standards of Protection to Proration, 29 U. CH. L. REv. 483 (1962).
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convicted, not "substantially related in kind." Finally, a maximum pe-
riod of time must be set for the service of probation to promote a re-
habilitative end and to prevent any attempt to use the criminal process
to effectuate a civil remedy, where the only bar to civil liability is the
statute of limitations.""o
IV. CONCLUSION
One of the aims of this article has been to trace, historically, the
diminishing role of the victim in the Anglo-American criminal process.
Although the victim's present position is a shadow compared to his
primitive forefathers, consideration for the harm suffered by the victim
is still a part of the present system of criminal justice at the pre-ad-
ministrative, administrative and judicial levels. An attempt has also been
made to show that the demise of community composition and the
gradual criminalization of certain harmful acts was a result of the inter-
vention of the state in the dispositionary stage of a legal proceeding in
its own behalf. In addition, the advantages and disadvantages of a sys-
tem of creative restitution have been described, and the inequities of
the present use of restitution as a condition of probation have been
brought to light. One further point to be explored is that the probation
machinery as presently set up could serve to implement a program of
creative restitution, but a minor change in procedure and a major change
in attitude will have to first occur.
The minor change in procedure is an answer to one jurisprudential
writer, who sees an initial roadblock to a rehabilitative ideal in the
very nature of the criminal process. In the words of 'Professor .Lon
Fuller:
The familiar penal or retributive theory looks to the act and seeks to
make the miscreant pay for his misdeed; the rehabilitative theory on
the other hand, sees the purpose of the law as recreating the person,
or improving the criminal himself so that any impulses toward mis-"
conduct will be eliminated or brought under internal control. De-
spite the humane appeal of the rehabilitative theory, the actual proc-
esses of criminal trials remain under the domination of the view
that we must try the act, and not the man; any departure from this
conception, it is feared, would sacrifice justice to a policy of pa-
ternalistic intervention in the life of the individual.""'
160 See Conditions of Probation Imposed on Wisconsin Felons, supra note 130, at 683.
161 Fuller, Two Principles of Hunmn Association 17-8, in 11 Nomos, VOLUNTARY
ASSOCIATIONS (1969).
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Yet a possible solution to Professor Fuller's dilemma would be the
introduction of a split proceeding into adult criminal trials. First, a
formalized hearing to determine whether an act was committed by the
particular defendant charged. Then, if such a finding be made, a second
informal hearing with the defendant actively participating, to deter-
mine a meaningful type of restitutionary penalty to be performed. This
would provide a factual determination of guilt 6 2 and an individualized
procedure for rehabilitation.
The major change in attitude involves not a recognition of injustice
done to criminal and victim, but of the injustice done to the legal proc-
ess by the present system of criminal justice. The very nature of
modern criminal law promotes the idea that punishment is a proper
legal objective, and, in so doing, it ignores the purposive nature of the
legal process. If law is viewed as a constructive process promoting inter-
action among individuals,68 then the criminal legal process in its present
form must be dismantled. In a creative process, while there will be
room for penalties to compensate injured parties, there will be no place
for punishment, a purely destructive and purposeless activity.'6 Yet,
recognizing that a proposal to dismantle the entire administration of
criminal justice is not likely to be implemented in the foreseeable future,
a minor step in the same positive direction would be the slow develop-
ment of a plan of creative restitution within the present system of pro-
bation machinery. Such a plan may appear today to be an insignificant
thread in the complex fabric called the system of criminal justice, but
it could serve as an initial stage in redesigning that fabric to remove
its destructive and denigrating characteristics.
'
6 2 The word "guilt" is used inappropriately here. The finding is not whether the
party is actually guilty of the offense, but (1) whether an act was in fact committed
(2) by this defendant. No value judgment would be made of the defendant's conduct.
163 L. FuLL.R, THE MoRALITY OF LAW 210, 221 (1964).
114 There is a distinction between a penalty and punishment. One is a recognition
of harm with accompanying payment; the other recognizes harm but inflicts harm in
return. "The idea of punishment as the law interprets it seems to be that inasmuch as
a man has offended society, society must officially offend him." K. MENNINGER, supra
note 125, at 71.
